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Abstract—Although iOS is the second most popular mobile
operating system and is often considered the more secure one,
approaches to automatically analyze iOS applications are scarce
and generic app analysis frameworks do not exist. This is on
the one hand due to the closed ecosystem putting obstacles in
the way of reverse engineers and on the other hand due to the
complexity of reverse engineering and analyzing app binaries.
Reliably lifting accurate call graphs, control flows, and data
dependence graphs from binary code, as well as reconstructing
object-oriented high-level concepts is a non-trivial task and
the choice of the lifted target representation determines the
analysis capabilities. None of the various existing intermediate
representations is a perfect fit for all types of analysis, while
the detection of vulnerabilities requires techniques ranging from
simple pattern matching to complex inter-procedural data flow
analyses. We address this gap by introducing liOS, a binary
lifting and analysis framework for iOS applications that extracts
lifted information from several frontends and unifies them in
a ”supergraph” representation that tolerates missing parts and
is further extended and interlinked by liOS ”passes”. A static
analysis of the binary is then realized in the form of graph
traversal queries, which can be considered as an advancement
of classic program query languages. We illustrate this approach
by means of a typical JavaScript/Objective-C bridge, which can
lead to remote code execution in iOS applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
iOS is the second most spread mobile operating system
and has ever since enjoyed a reputation as the ”more secure”
system, compared to Android. While this might actually be
true when considering the security features of the iOS hard-
ware and software stack, a substantial part of this reputation
originates from the fact that the app ecosystem is largely under
exclusive control of Apple. The bar for distributing malware
is much higher due to the obligation to enroll in the Apple
developer program, the AppStore review process, and Apple’s
ability to centrally revoke an app. However, malware is not
the only threat to users’ security and privacy, and for iOS it
might even be the less relevant one.
The closed nature of the app ecosystem and the fact that
iOS applications are much harder to reverse engineer – let
alone repackage – than Android apps has drawn the attention
of many researchers and hackers away from iOS to platforms
that are easier to assess and attack. But iOS applications are
not necessarily more secure than their Android equivalents. In
contrast to Android apps which mostly consist of memory-
safe bytecode and are assigned a separate user ID per app,
iOS apps typically run under the same user account mobile
and are confined by the Sandbox which enforces mandatory
access control profiles on them – a mechanism which has been
shown to be flawed in the past [3]. For users, the internals of
an iOS app remain highly unclear and trust in an app relies
exclusively on the AppStore review process whose details are
not publicly known and which has been circumvented in the
past [17]. Thus, ways to automatically analyze iOS apps for
vulnerabilities are urgently needed to increase transparency for
the user and to build trust in the ecosystem.
Precise automated static analysis of binary iOS applications
is however not trivial and only few contributions have been
made so far by the research community [5], [6]. First, the
majority of iOS apps are not easily accessible due to the
FairPlay DRM encryption which is supposed to prevent apps
from being copied. Although not insurmountable, the mecha-
nism is a considerable hurdle for researchers to get their hands
on a large corpus of iOS apps, as discussed by Orikogbo et
al. [13]. Further, iOS apps do not come in form of easily
analyzable bytecode, but in form of native ARM binaries that
make it more difficult and error-prone to recover high-level
information such as function calls and variable aliases. Above-
cited research has shown that it is still possible to detect
specific vulnerabilities by analyzing the app binary but up to
date, there is no generic static analysis framework available
that allows to detect arbitrary vulnerability pattern in iOS
apps. Specifically, the following challenges have not been
satisfactorily solved:
• Lifting iOS apps to a representation that covers both the
semantics of low-level assembly as well as high-level
object oriented concepts
• A thorough approach to take into account the semantics
of the Objective-C/Swift runtime
• A generic way to statically analyze iOS apps for different
types of vulnerabilities
In this paper, we address these challenges and propose
liOS, a framework for static binary analysis that can detect
configuration-, control flow-, and data flow-based vulnerabil-
ities. liOS is extensible in that it accepts input from var-
ious frontends and combines them in a single graph-based
representation, called the supergraph. While some frontends
operate directly on the disassembly, others lift the aarch64
binary to the LLVM intermediate representation (IR) to sup-
port further analysis techniques from the existing LLVM
ecosystem, or extract higher-level information such as class
hierarchy, methods, and variables from the binary. The graph-
based representation allows us to combine the output of these
frontends into one unified representation, linking information
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from all frontends with each other. This is especially useful
when dealing with an incomplete representation – a recurring
problem with binary lifting, which is never fully accurate
for applications of realistic size and complexity. Further, it
allows us to map the implementation of static analysis methods
in liOS to the problem of finding a graph traversal, i.e.
a set of paths in the supergraph with specific properties.
This approach decouples the actual artifact (in our case, an
iOS app) from the overall analysis framework and allows to
plug in further analysis techniques at a later time by simply
adding graph traversals. We give details on the supergraph
construction and illustrate how typical static analysis problems
can be solved with graph traversals. Through a typical remote
code execution vulnerability, we illustrate how liOS is able to
discover complex vulnerabilities in iOS binaries.
Section II guides through the overall process of automated
reverse engineering and analysis of iOS apps, conducted by
liOS. Section III introduces the concept of the supergraph and
Section IV explains how liOS uses it to analyze iOS apps.
We show how liOS detects even complex vulnerabilities in
iOS apps and discuss its practical application in Section V.
Section VI discusses related work and Section VII concludes
the paper.
II. THE REVERSE ENGINEERING PROCESS
Automated reverse engineering of iOS apps is a complex
process involving several steps. Figure 1 depicts this process
and shows the contributions of liOS (marked corners). In this
section, we will walk through this process and explain how
liOS converts a binary iOS application into a representation
suited for program analysis.
A. Unzipping the IPA and Loading the Binary
We start with a decrypted .ipa file that is either directly
exported as an archive from XCode or has been dumped from
a physical device. When installed from the Apple AppStore,
Mach-O sections will be encrypted with the public key that
is assigned to the Apple account associated with the physical
device, whose corresponding private key is managed by the
Secure Enclave TEE on the phone. This mechanism is part of
Apple’s FairPlay DRM and ways to circumvent it are known
since 2008. As decryption of sections is already done by the
binary loader when mapping sections to memory segments, it
is easy enough to load the app into memory, dump its segments
in clear text and re-assemble an unencrypted binary. Orikogbo
et al. have shown in [13] that this process can be fully
automated and although their success rate when decrypting
the binary is only about 51%, our experience is that a much
higher (> 95%) success rate can be achieved by using more
recent devices and the Frida DBI framework1.
The actual analysis process of liOS begins with extracting
the Mach-O binary from the zip-compressed .ipa file, along
with further files which are relevant for the analysis at a
later time, such as Info.plist. The aarch64 binary is
1https://github.com/AloneMonkey/frida-ios-dump
extracted from the fat Mach-O and passed to the loader of
liOS which parses the binary’s load commands to recon-
struct segments (LC_SEGMENT), symbol tables (LC_SYMTAB
and LC_DYSYMTAB), and function boundaries (LC_FUNC-
TION_STARTS). The detection of function boundaries in a
binary blob in the absence of debug symbols is a notoriously
difficult problem and modern disassemblers apply heuristic
approaches such as BYTEWEIGHT [1], FID [16] or FLIRT
[7] to determine where a function starts. Luckily, in contrast
to PE and ELF binaries, the Mach-O format includes an
LC_FUNCTION_STARTS load command in its header which
points to the address of a list of function start pointers. This list
is implemented as a zero-terminated sequence of ULEB128-
encoded [4, pp. 221] addresses indicating the start of all
functions, from the lowest to the highest address. While this
function list is mainly used for producing meaningful output
for debuggers or stack traces, it is not to be confused with
debug symbols which would get removed from the binary by
the strip command. The function list remains intact even
in stripped binaries and allows us to precisely and efficiently
reconstruct function boundaries from any iOS application.
B. Class hierarchies and Selectors
iOS apps are written in either Swift of Objective-C which
are both executed in the Objective-C binary runtime, but may
also include C/C++ libraries. A subset of the functions in
the aforementioned function list will thus map to methods of
Objective-C or Swift classes and reconstructing this mapping
along with a correct class hierarchy is essential for creating a
clean call graph. As the Objective-C runtime needs precise
information about the class hierarchy to properly resolve
method calls, this information must always be contained in
the Mach-O file and we can extract it from the file’s sections.
Section __objc_classlist contains a list of pointers to
class_t structs, describing the classes contained in the pro-
gram by their superclass, meta class, size, protocols, methods,
instance variables, and properties. Section __objc_class-
ref, in contrast, contains a list of classref_t structs
describing all classes used by the program at runtime. In the
Objective-C runtime (i.e. in Swift and Objective-C likewise),
every struct with an isa pointer to a class_t struct is
considered a class. The isa pointer indicates the meta-class of
the class, i.e. the object providing the methods and properties
operating on the class itself – similar to the Class object
in Java. Just as every class can have a superclass, every
meta-class has a superclass, too. The top of the concrete
class hierarchy is indicated by a nil superclass pointer
(typically in NSObject), while the top of the meta-class
hierarchy is indicated by a cycle, i.e. an isa pointer pointing
to the meta-class itself. It is one of Objective-C’s quirks that
the topmost meta-class has a superclass pointer to its
corresponding concrete class and that accessing the class
method of a Class object does not provide its meta-class,
but rather the Class object itself. Figure 2 illustrates this
possibly at first confusing constellation
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Fig. 1: Lifting and reverse engineering process
Besides classes, the Objective-C runtime supports proto-
cols, which are implementation-less and class-independent
definitions of methods and properties. Methods declared by a
protocol are marked required or optional, and classes adopting
the protocol must provide implementations for the former, but
may omit any optional method. Protocols support inheritance
and classes may adopt any number of protocols. However, in
contrast to classes, there is no such thing as meta-protocols
– in fact, the Protocol object type extends the base class
NSObject. In many cases, the iOS system APIs specify
protocols to be implemented by application classes, e.g. to
receive data from an API call in a callback function. Thus,
knowing the protocols implemented by an app helps reverse
engineers understanding the used APIs and functionality of
the app. liOS extracts protocol information from the respective
Mach-O sections and includes it in the type hierarchy.
Methods of Objective-C classes are identified by selectors.
Their names are listed as null-terminated strings in section
__objc_methname, referenced by a list of pointers in
section __objc_selref. As methods are referenced by
selectors, rather than direct pointers, the implementation of a
method is only loosely coupled to its name and its class, which
allows the Objective-C runtime to dynamically manipulate
methods (“method swizzling”) and load code. This is great for
developers, but a challenge for secure programming and static
analysis. As method calls in Objective-C are not implemented
as direct BL/BLX branches to specific addresses but rather
as a message containing the desired object (“IMP”) and
method (“SEL”) that is sent to the Objective-C runtime via
the obj_msgSend function, a naively constructed call graph
is almost exclusively centered around that function and does
not correctly reflect method calls.
C. Disassembly
In parallel to extracting the type hierarchy, we start disas-
sembling the binary starting from each function boundary and
then lift disassembled function bodies to a graph representation
that can be further processed, as explained in the next section.
Besides determining segment boundaries and reconstructing
the actual instructions and basic blocks, this includes keeping
track of cross-references, e.g. to resolve local variables and
the use of constants.
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D. Call Graph Reconstruction
Reconstructing a proper call graph is a prerequisite for
any precise interprocedural analysis. Unfortunately, Objective-
C has some quirks which make the reconstruction of a call
graph not straightforward. As one of the first object oriented
languages supporting dynamic binding and message-based
dispatching, there is no such concept as a direct method call
in Objective-C. Rather, the caller only constructs a message
stating a receiver, a selector and optional arguments. This
message is handed to the objc_msgSend dispatcher of
the Objective-C runtime which is responsible for finding
the receiver, finding an appropriate method implementation
matching the receiver, and performing the call. Thus, when
naively creating a call graph from an Objective-C binary, one
will receive a construct as shown in 3a. In fact, we are not
aware of any disassembly tool (IDA Pro, Hopper, radare2) that
is able to construct any other call graph representation than
the one shown in 3a. A precise call graph creation requires
to reconstruct the possible values of the receiver and selector
argument to all objc_msgSend calls. As these arguments
can be dynamically set at runtime, possibly even by user-
provided input values, generally reconstructing them by a
static analysis is infeasible. In practice, however, we found
that reconstruction of these arguments is possible with a high
success rate, because the Objective-C/Swift compiler creates
selectors as pointers to string constants and receivers as point-
ers to either the class or object instance. These are typically
assigned to registers within the same function as the call to
objc_msgSend, however not necessarily near the call, nor
always constructed in the same way. To reliably reconstruct
these argument values, we thus employ the algorithm shown in
Algorithm 1 to reconstruct values of the registers x0 (receiver)
and x1 (selector) for each call to objc_msgSend.
Algorithm 1 Backtracing of registers for method call recon-
struction
1: procedure BACKTRACE(reg , addr ) . reg: register
2: . addr: Code location with use of v
3: V ← {(reg, addr)}
4: while V 6= ∅ do
5: (x, l)← pop(V )
6: instr ← INSTRUCTIONATLOCATION(l)
7: if instr is ASSIGNMENT then
8: def ← instr.DEFINITION
9: use← instr.USE
10: if def matches x then
11: . If immediate pointer to objc *-segments:
12: if PointsToConstant(use) then
13: return {DEREFERENCE(use)}
14: else
15: V ← V ∪ (use, l)
16: else if instr is BRANCHINSTR then
17: rcv ← BACKTRACE(x0, pred(l))
18: sel← BACKTRACE(x1, pred(l))
19: return {rcv.sel}
20: else if pred(l) = ∅ then
21: . If reached begin of function:
22: if x = x0 then
23: . x0 points to own class/instance name
24: return {SELF}
25: else if x = x1 then
26: . x1 points to own function name (selector)
27: return {SEL}
28: else
29: V ← V ∪ {(x, l′)|l ′ ∈ pred(l)}
The algorithm operates on a work list V holding pairs of
registers and code locations. It works backwards along the
control flow graph and traces chains of register assignments
until it reaches an assignment from a constant or the entry
point of the function. The former case is handled by line 12,
where registers hold a pointer to some struct in the Objective-
C segments (such as __objc_methname). In the latter case,
if register x0 is not explicitly set at all (line 22), it refers to the
first parameter of the function, which is typically a pointer to
SELF, i.e. the class or object declaring the function. Further,
function calls can be constructed dynamically by retrieving
receiver and selector as a return value from another function
(a) CG created by IDA Pro (b) CG reconstructed by liOS
Fig. 3: Call Graph before and after dispatch reconstruction
call (line 16). In this case, the algorithm will interprocedurally
trace the values by recursively analyzing the called function.
Although in theory soundness of the algorithm is limited in
that it is only flow- but not path sensitive, our experience is
that code created by the Objective-C compiler does not use
path-dependent receiver and selector values.
Once receiver and selector have been reconstructed, the
aforementioned class hierarchy is looked up to retrieve the
address of the actual method implementation and an edge from
the caller to that address is inserted into the call graph.
III. A SUPERGRAPH REPRESENTATION OF LIFTED
BINARIES
The information gained during the reverse engineering pro-
cess must be combined in a single representation serving the
analyses. Traditional program analysis frameworks use fixed
data structures with strong dependencies which cannot easily
be extended and capture only a single level of abstraction (i.e.,
assembly, object-oriented constructs, or syntactical language-
level issues). For most use cases of static source code analysis,
this is not a hurdle. For binary analysis, however, we must
assume that the individual results of the reverse engineering
steps are incomplete, inconsistent, or even missing. We thus
choose to merge them in an extensible representation that
allows to run analyses on incomplete information at different
abstraction levels, obviously sacrificing completeness and –
depending on the analysis – also soundness. While this might
appear as a drawback to the reader, we point out that soundness
and completeness are two extremes that cannot be achieved
perfectly at the same time. For analyzing realistic programs,
it is much more important to the user that the tool is able
to operate on the program at all, while being ”as sound and
complete as it gets” (cf. [15], [10]).
A. Construction of the Supergraph
liOS represents the results of the reverse engineering step in
form of a graph representation. The initial graph is constructed
from the inputs of the reverse engineering steps (frontends) and
subsequently extended by further passes to build a supergraph.
This supergraph is the basis for the actual analysis modules,
which run graph traversal queries against it. Graph models
for static program analysis have been used before [19], [11],
[9], however only for approaches operating at source code
level and with fixed graph structures. We apply this concept
to binary analysis and allow the graph to be extended during
analysis. We especially regard the latter aspect as crucial
TABLE I: Node properties
Node Label (L) Property (Σ) Description
PROGRAM ea Extended address
name Name of binary
entltl Entitlements of app
info Content of Info.plist
FUNCTION ea Extended address
name Name of function
is_ext External or implemented function
llvm LLVM IR representation of func-
tion body
is_ep Is function an entrypoint of the app?
METHOD name Name of method
CLASS name Name of class
BASICBLOCK ea Extended address
INSTRUCTION ea Extended address
bytes Bytes of the actual instruction
asm Assembly representation
IVAR ea Extended address
TABLE II: Edges
Edge Description
impl (FUNCTION ×METHOD) Method of a class that corre-
sponds to a function
succ (BASICBLOCK × BASICBLOCK) Successor of basic block
def (INSTRUCTION × INSTRUCTION) Definition of a variable used
by the current instruction
implements (FUNCTION ×METHOD) Function implementing a
method
calls (FUNCTION × FUNCTION) Function calls (possibly indi-
rect)
has_superclass (CLASS × CLASS) Class hierarchy
has_protocol (CLASS × PROTOCOL) Protocols of a class
isa (CLASS × CLASS) Metaclass hierarchy
has_meth((CLASS ∪ PROTOCOL)
× METHOD)
Method of a class/metaclass
when lifting binaries from assembly to increasingly high-level
representations, while coping with possibly incomplete results
from each step.
A property graph PG = (V,E,Σ, σ,L, `) is a directed
labeled “multi-graph” of vertices V and edges E = {(v, u) ∈
V × V }, where each vertex and edge has a (possibly empty)
set of key-value properties. Σ denotes an alphabet of property
keys for vertices and edges and the property function σ :
(V ∪E)×Σ→ S assigns values of value set S to the property
keys of vertices and edges. Further, each node and edge is
assigned a label by the labeling function ` : (V ∪ E) → L.
The graph can be queried using graph traversal functions. A
graph traversal T = (PG, ◦,identity) is a monoid over
a property graph PG with an associative method chaining
function ◦ and a neutral element identity. By chaining
traversal functions, we can build arbitrary complex queries
over nodes and edges and their labels and properties. We write
◦n to denote the n-times repetition of a traversal function and
◦∗ to denote its reflexive transitive closure. The extensible
supergraph comprises different building blocks of an iOS app
and as further frontend modules or passes are added to liOS,
additional labeled nodes and edges may be added.
The root of the supergraph is a PROGRAM node, repre-
senting the Mach-O binary of the app. Its properties hold
values such as entitlements and contents from the Info.plist
file. PROGRAM has edges to all FUNCTIONs implemented and
imported by the binary. Imported external functions have a
IS EXT property set and an address (EA) of -1, while functions
implemented by the application have their function body
stored in LLVM IR. While not every function corresponds
to a method, the other way round applies: every METHOD
of a CLASS that is implemented by the app corresponds to
a respective function, denoted by the implements edge.
Every function has edges to its basic blocks which have edges
to their instructions. These instructions refer to the actual
assembly instructions and thus map to specific addresses (ea),
as opposed to the LLVM representation. We further capture
data flows by adding use-def edges pointing from every use
of a memory location or register to the instruction defining its
value, whereas the edge is assigned a property var referring to
the respective memory location. Consequently, this basic graph
model captures the control flow graph (CFG), call graph (CG),
and data dependence graph (DDG), together with additional
information such as LLVM IR function bodies and application
metadata. Just by processing the graph and without adding
further information, this representation allows to construct a
forward dominance tree (FDT) and a program dependence
graph (PDG), which we do not explicitly compute and store for
performance reasons. We will show in the example below in
Section V how we can leverage this graph structure to compute
static taint flows and data-dependent program slices, i.e. the
minimal set of instructions in a function that has equivalent
semantics with respect to the values of a specific register or
memory location as the original function.
B. Static Program Analysis using the Supergraph
This section discusses the use of graph traversals for
building increasingly abstract static analyses in the form of
queries against the supergraph. Just like passes can extract the
graph to hold more high-level information, we start with basic
queries which are then re-used in more complex patterns.
1) Call Graph Traversals: Functions serving as entry points
to the application are marked by the boolean property is_ep.
In contrast to traditional linux binaries, execution of an app
does not start at a single main method, but at various callback
handlers which must be considered at entry points into the
call graph. A graph traversal querying for all vertices with the
is_ep flag set is rather simple:
ENTRYPOINTS = {v ∈ V : σ(v,is_entrypoint = true)}
Further exploring the call graph, it will be interesting to find all
functions that are called from a given function, i.e. all callees.
Considering that function calls in the graph representation
already abstract away the specifics of the Objective-C run-
time such as reflective invocations via objc_msgSend, this
simple graph traversal can already reveal interesting insights
into an app, such as the iOS APIs used by it. We denote the
query for all callees of a function x as follows:
CALLEES(x) = {v ∈ V : (x, v) ∈ E ,
`(v) = FUNCTION ,
`((x, v)) = calls}
By transitively chaining this graph traversal to get its transitive
hull, it is now possible to create a more abstract graph traversal
that gives all functions which are transitively reachable from
a given function x:
REACHABLES (x) =
⋃
v∈V
x ◦∗ CALLEES(v)
2) Control Flow Traversals: Analog to call graph traver-
sals, the control flow of each function implemented by the
app can be explored. For instance, to retrieve all immediate
successors of a basic block, i.e. typically the immediately
following instruction and the jump target, a graph traversal
SUCCESSORS can be defined.
SUCCESSORS (x) = {v ∈ V :(x, v) ∈ E
and `((x, v)) = succ}
Again, the query for an immediate successor can be transi-
tively extended. Rather than querying for the mere set of all
successors (i.e., all blocks of non-dead code in a function),
we can retrieve all execution paths from a given basic block
x. As functions with loops would result in infinite paths, a
maximum path length lmax can be set.
EXEPATH (x) =
〈
v0, .., vn : vi, vi+1 ∈ V,
(vi, vi+1) ∈ E, v0 = x ,
n < lmax ,
`((vi, vi+1)) = succ
〉
3) Data Flow Traversals: By following the def edges
between instructions in a function, it is further possible to
express a backward slicing of a function with respect to a
value q used at an instruction x:
DATAFLOW (x, q) =
〈
v0, ..., vn : vi, vi+1 ∈ V,
(vi, vi+1) ∈ E, v0 = x ,
σ((v0, v1),var) = q ,
`((vi, vi+1)) = def
〉
IV. LIOS ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
In this section, we discuss the software components of
liOS and point out how the aforementioned graph traversals
can be made more accessible to the user in the form of a
simple domain specific language (DSL). liOS uses a plugin-
architecture to delegate the graph construction and analysis
of liOS to several modules. It first creates an empty graph
object and then calls a set of frontend modules which operate
on the binary file and create initial nodes and edges into
the graph. liOS then calls a series of passes – modules
which process the existing graph and create further nodes and
edges, representing higher-level concepts. Besides extending
the graph, passes implement static analyses in the form of
graph traversals and optionally make them available as new
graph traversals with a shorthand notation in the DSL. That
is, a complex graph traversal for an intraprocedural static taint
analysis, for instance, can be made available to the user as
a simple tainted(source,sink) operation that returns
all “tainted” paths from a specific source to a specific sink.
The query DSL is implemented on top of the Gremlin2 graph
query language.
A. Frontends
Frontends are responsible for extracting information from
a binary and provide it in form of a property graph. liOS
includes three main frontend modules: the lifter, a disassembly
frontend, and a class hierarchy frontend.
1) Lifter Frontend: The lifter operates on the binary and
reconstructs the program structure in form of a McSema CFG
file3. As McSema itself is not able to handle specifics of
iOS apps, such as cross-references or the class hierarchy, we
implemented a new lifter frontend that operates on the aarch64
Mach-O binary, creates the disassembly (using radare2), and
reconstructs the control flow graph and cross-references to
variables. The result is a McSema-compatible “CFG” file
which is then loaded into a graph with nodes representing
functions, basic blocks, instructions, variables, and cross-
references between code and data locations.
2) Class Hierarchy Frontend: As the lifter is concerned
with disassembly only, it does not have any understanding of
the object-oriented concepts of Swift and Objective-C. While
it merely operates at the level of functions and instructions, we
obviously need further information about the class hierarchy
which can be easily extracted from the segments of the Mach-
O binary. However, none of the existing tools was able to
provide a clean and complete representation of the Objective-
C class hierarchy to our satisfaction. IDA Pro4 does not have
any understanding of object-oriented structures. jTool dumps
only class names. radare2 creates a class hierarchy, but omits
properties and protocols. llvm-objdump provides extensive
output of the Objective-C segments, but omits the actual
pointers to function entry points. We therefore implemented
a module to parse the Objective-C sections from the Mach-O
file and reconstruct classes, meta-classes, protocols, properties,
and methods and add respective vertices and edges to the
graph.
3) Disassembly Frontend: The lifter frontend already cre-
ates representations of functions, basic blocks and individual
instructions. However, it does not parse instructions in any
way and only represents them as INSTRUCTION nodes with
edges to their basic block. The disassembly frontend adds
semantics to instructions by parsing the disassembly using an
ANTLR streaming parser [14] and processing the disassembly
as follows:
2https://tinkerpop.apache.org/gremlin.html
3https://github.com/trailofbits/mcsema/blob/master/mcsema/CFG/CFG.
proto
4version 6.8, in our case
Whenever an instruction refers to a cross-reference, an
xref edge to the respective target is inserted into the graph. In
case of an immediate operand (i.e. a constant value) or when a
direct memory reference to a constant could be reconstructed
by radare2, the respective constant value is assigned as a
property to the xref’ed node. This allows to directly find all
uses of a specific constant in the supergraph and is a significant
advantage when writing graph traversals.
When an instruction is a branch statement to the objc_-
msgSend method, we reconstruct the values of the registers
holding the SEL and IMP values using the algorithm from
Algorithm 1 and insert a call edge into the graph. Direct
branches to functions are obviously easier to handle and do
not require any back tracing to create a respective calls
edge. The output of this frontend is thus comprised of a call
graph and cross-references that resembles the actual high-
level program in Swift/Objective-C, rather than the immediate
references at assembly level.
Further, the disassembly frontend creates use-def edges
(named def) connecting the instruction using a memory
location to the instructions defining it. As these edges are
constructed at assembly level and not in a single static assign-
ment form, a single use instruction may point to several def
instructions in different basic blocks. As for memory locations,
we support the 31 general purpose ARM registers, as well
as references to memory locations, including simple pointer
arithmetic on stack-relative offsets.
B. Passes
After creating the initial graph from the frontend’s output,
passes are responsible for extending the graph by further
edges, nodes, and properties. Although passes are thought of
as a plugin-mechanism to add further graph transformations at
a later time, liOS includes a built-in pass to link and extend
the isolated sub-graphs from the three frontends. For instance,
the lifter frontend detects function entries by looking up the
values from the LC_FUNCTION_STARTS Mach-O header
and gets its name by demangling the respective symbol. The
class hierarchy frontend running in parallel takes a different
approach and extracts method names from the respective
binary segments. As these are more precise in that they do not
require demangling and contain the actual method signature,
we link functions to methods with a matching address by
inserting implements edges between the respective nodes.
This way, it becomes possible to query the graph for the
precise method signature and retrieve the body of the function
implementing the method – either as McSema LLVM IR or
as a subgraph of assembly instructions.
C. Extensible Graph Query Language
As a persistence layer, liOS uses the Neo4J graph database
[18]. However, to abstract away the persistence layer, liOS
does not directly access Neo4J, nor uses its built-in query
language “Cypher”. Rather, we use the Apache Tinkerpop
framework that is a generic graph database interface and
allows to easily exchange the backend e.g. by an in-memory
database. Tinkerpop also comes with a database-independent
graph traversal query language called Gremlin. To make the
supergraph more accessible for static analyses, liOS makes use
of Gremlin’s support for the creation of domain-specific lan-
guages (DSL). The purpose of the DSL is to wrap commonly
used traversals in reusable shorthand notations that can be used
to build increasingly complex queries. Consider for instance
a graph traversal that returns all functions of an application
which dynamically load and execute code. In plain gremlin,
this query would be written as follows:
1 g .V( ) . h a s L a b e l ( ”FUNCTION” ) / / Get a l l f u n c t i o n s
2 . o u t ( ” has bb ” ) / / and t h e i r b a s i c
↪→ b l o c k s
3 . o u t ( ” i n s t r ” ) / / and t h e i r
↪→ i n s t r u c t i o n s
4 . o u t ( ” c a l l s ” ) / / which imp lemen t a
↪→ c a l l
5 . has ( ”name” , ” NSInvoke . i nv ok e ” ) / / t o [ NSInvoke
↪→ i n v o k e ]
In liOS’s domain specific language, the query can be written
much simpler by calling the predefined shortcuts functions
referring to all functions nodes and filtering them by the
calling() shortcut:
1 f u n c t i o n s ( ) . c a l l i n g ( ” NSInvoke . i nv ok e ” )
To extend the DSL is such way, pass modules need to
provide the implementation of a Gremlin GraphTraver-
salSource and a GraphTraversal object. The user can
then write queries using the DSL and load it into the Jython-
based interpreter of liOS.
V. SPOTTING VULNERABILITIES IN IOS APPS
In the following, we illustrate how liOS identifies vul-
nerabilities in iOS applications. For the sake of demonstra-
tion, we consider a remote code execution vulnerability in a
JavaScript-Objective-C bridge – a common technique mainly
used by advertisement and analytics frameworks such as
Google Analytics or MoPub, as well as web-based cross-
platform development frameworks such as Apache Cordova
or React Native.
A. Example: Vulnerable WebView Delegates
iOS apps use WebView components to render web contents
such as HTML, JavaScript, and CSS from the Internet or
from local resources in order to display advertisements or
refer the user to online web pages without leaving the app.
Cross-platform app development frameworks rely to a large
extend on WebViews to render HTML-based user interfaces
and use native APIs only to access lower-level functionality
of the device. This is however not straightforward because
web pages are confined in their WebView and cannot make
direct calls into the iOS APIs. Although Apple does not
provide an official way to provide iOS API access to JavaScript
running in a WebView, there is a well-established workaround
which is heavily used by applications throughout the app store
(approx. 70% of 4000 analyzed apps). It requires registering a
delegate object of type UIWebViewDelegate at a WebView
and implementing its method shouldStartLoadWithRe-
quest which is invoked by the WebView whenever a new
resource is about to be loaded from a URL. Its successor
decidePolicyForNavigationAction works likewise,
and the vulnerability discussed herein is equally applicable.
The function receives the URL as an argument, can
perform any action and finally return YES or NO to determine
whether the WebView should load the new URL or discard
the request. This can be used to call native functions from a
WebView, by encoding the to-be-called functions in the URL,
as illustrated by this line of JavaScript:
window.location="native:MYCLASS:do_-
something:param1:param2";
By default, the WebView would try to load the URL
native:MYCLASS:do_something:param1:param2
and obviously fail due to the unsupported URL scheme
native:. To actually call native APIs, the app developer
hooks into the WebView’s lifecycle by implementing
shouldStartLoadWithRequest, parsing the called
URL, and mapping it to any native API calls. How this
mapping is done remains up to the developer and is
cause of a severe vulnerability if done incorrectly. If the
implementation directly maps non-sanitized URL parameters
to function calls, the app will call any native function as
determined by the web page. In combination with either
missing or flawed TLS communication or cross-site scripting
vulnerabilities in the rendered web page, this opens a remote
code execution vulnerability that allows an attacker to inject
code into context of the running app and exfiltrate sensitive
information from the device. Given the wide-spread use
of this technique and the fact that apps can still opt out
of transport security (ATS) (done in approx 75% of 4000
analyzed apps), this is a realistic scenario.
Consider the implementation of shouldStartLoadWith-
Request given in Listing 1.
Listing 1: Vulnerable WebView delegate
1 − (BOOL) webView : ( UIWebView ∗ ) webView
↪→ s h o u l d S t a r t L o a d W i t h R e q u e s t : ( NSURLRequest
↪→ ∗ ) r e q u e s t n a v i g a t i o n T y p e : (
↪→ UIWebViewNavigationType ) n a v i g a t i o n T y p e {
2
3 NSSt r ing ∗ r e q = [ [ r e q u e s t URL] a b s o l u t e S t r i n g
↪→ ] ;
4 i f ( [ r e q h a s P r e f i x :@”my−p r e f i x : ” ] ) {
5
6 NSArray ∗ s p l i t = [ r e q s p l i t S e p a r a t e d B y S t r i n g
↪→ :@” : ” ] ;
7 NSSt r ing∗ o b j = ( NSSt r ing ∗ ) [ s p l i t
↪→ o b j e c t A t I n d e x : 1 ] ;
8 NSSt r ing∗ method = [ ( NSSt r ing ∗ ) [ s p l i t
↪→ o b j e c t A t I n d e x : 2 ]
9 s t r i n g B y R e p l a c i n g P e r c e n t−
↪→ EscapesUs ingEncod ing :
↪→ NSUTF8Str ingEncoding ] ;
10 SEL s e l e c t o r = N S S e l e c t o r F r o m S t r i n g ( method ) ;
11 C l a s s c l s = NSClassFromSt r ing ( o b j ) ;
12 NSMethodSignature∗ s i g = [ c l s
↪→ m e t h o d S i g n a t u r e F o r S e l e c t o r : s e l e c t o r ] ;
13 N S I n v o c a t i o n ∗ i n v o k e r = [ N S I n v o c a t i o n
↪→ i n v o c a t i o n W i t h M e t h o d S i g n a t u r e : s i g ] ;
14 i n v o k e r . s e l e c t o r = s e l e c t o r ;
15 i n v o k e r . t a r g e t = c l s ;
16 [ i n v o k e r inv ok e ] ;
17 re turn NO;
18 }
19
20 i f ( ! s e l f . r e a l D e l e g a t e ) {
21 re turn YES ;
22 }
23
24 re turn [ s e l f . r e a l D e l e g a t e webView : webView
↪→ s h o u l d S t a r t L o a d W i t h R e q u e s t : r e q u e s t
↪→ n a v i g a t i o n T y p e : n a v i g a t i o n T y p e ] ;
25 }
This WebView handler parses the URL and extracts the
strings obj and method, indicating the class and method
to call. Without further sanity checks, a method call is con-
structed and then executed, imposing a way for attackers to
trigger any code execution by manipulating the URL parame-
ters of the WebView.
Detecting this vulnerability is not possible by a simple
pattern matching, but rather requires analysis of intraproce-
dural control- and data flows, plus an investigation of the
implemented protocols and the application transport security
(ATS) settings of the app. More precisely, we must first
check whether the app implements the shouldStartLoad-
WithRequest method of the UIWebView (and not only
an equally named method). Within that method, we must
trace data flows from the attacker-controlled input (here: the
request argument) to sensitive functions (here: NSClass-
FromString, for instance) and then check whether the
respective value is passed as an argument to the critical
[NSInvocation invoke] method call – two instances of
a classic static taint analysis problem.
To support such data flow analyses, we analyze use-def
chains in the supergraph. A use-def chain is a directed
acyclic graph starting at an instruction that uses a value to
all instructions that previously define the value. These chains
are represented by def edges in the supergraph so that it is
possible to trace back all data flows within a function, starting
from a ”critical” sink. This is illustrated by Figure 4. The
figure shows a subgraph of the supergraph that captures the
vulnerable pattern from Listing 1, whereas the yellow node
indicates the UIWebView protocol, the gray node the class
implementing the protocol, the red node the method declared
by that class, and the connected green node the function
implementing that method. All further green nodes refer to
external functions, i.e. functions which are called, but not
implemented by the binary. Blue nodes refer to the basic
blocks of the function and pink nodes stand for individual
instructions. The subgraph does not include all instructions of
the function, but only the ones along the use-def-path from
the critical data sink to the begin of the function – i.e. to
the point where they are populated from method arguments.
This can be understood by starting at the green node with the
red outline, which represents the call to NSClassForName
(i.e., the sink) and then following the def arrows along all
pink statement nodes to the head of the shouldStart-
LoadWithRequest method. This chain represents the un-
sanitized data flow from the method’s argument to the critical
NSClassForName call, spanning two basic blocks (created
by the if-statement in line 4 of Listing 1) and four calls
to external functions before it enters the sink: URL, abso-
luteString, componentsSeparatedByString, and
objectAtIndex. None of these functions is considered to
sanitize the argument, so we end up with a critical function
that directly operates on possibly malicious user input. The
calls invoked by line 8 and 11 of the listing are not contained
in the subgraph, because they are not part of the data flow
relevant to reach NSClassFromString and thus not part
of the program slicing. Retrieving information about the ATS
configuration of the application is trivial and can be done
by evaluating the info property of the PROGRAM node.
As the example shows, liOS is able to detect fairly complex
vulnerability patterns that include data flow- and control flow-
based program slicings, call graph patterns and configurations
from metadata such as from Info.plist. This goes well
beyond detecting simple calls to unsafe APIs or incorrectly
ordered cryptographic operations.
B. Performance and Footprint
Similar to PQL [11], our approach separates the heavy
lifting phase from the actual search for vulnerability patterns.
This has the advantage that the computing-intense binary lift-
ing and graph construction needs to run only once, while users
may add further analyses at any time afterwards, and simply
run them as queries against the already existing supergraph.
However, we obviously had to achieve a trade-off between an
extensive but slow pre-computation and a faster but limited
supergraph creation. To give the reader an impression of
performance and memory footprint of liOS, we consider the
vulnerable Swift app from above.
The aarch64 Mach-O binary of the app itself is 301 KB
large, implements six classes and a total of 85 functions – a
large portion of them being stubs and parts of the Objective-
C runtime. Additionally, it makes use of 55 external functions
which will result in further nodes and edges in the supergraph.
Running liOS against the app results in a graph of 6800 nodes,
7340 edges and 13700 property values, totaling to a 5.4 MB
graph database. The time to lift the binary amounts to 20
seconds, plus 24 seconds to construct the supergraph5 and run
the passes. It is reasonable to assume that this simple app
denotes an upper bound for the ratio of graph database size to
binary size and a lower bound for the total database size and
computing time.
VI. RELATED WORK
Considerably less work on static analysis of iOS apps than
on Android apps exists and as discussed in [12], analyzing
binaries imposes significantly higher challenges than source-
or bytecode. Nevertheless, the problem has been tackled before
5on a standard x86 i7 laptop with 16 GB of RAM
by PiOS [5], a privacy analysis approach for iOS binaries by
Egele et al., which – similar to our work – strives for an
automated reverse engineering and data flow analysis of iOS
apps. Also, work by Feichtner et al. [6] aims at identifying
vulnerabilities in iOS binaries. Both differ in several aspects
from liOS: PiOS hardcodes their data flow analysis directly
on 32-bit ARM assembly and does thus not support newer
platforms or an extension by vulnerability patterns. Feichtner
et al. use dagger, a fork of the LLVM disassembler to lift
ARM assembly to LLVM IR and immediately compute a
forward program slicing with respect to the use of crypto-
graphic functions. The result is a LLVM slice which is not
executable and specific to the analyzed CCryptor API, but
typically much smaller than the overall graph generated by
liOS. In contrast to these works, liOS combines the result of
different reverse engineering inputs, including disassembly and
LLVM lifting, into a unified graph representation that tolerates
missing information. For LLVM lifting, we extend McSema
which in general aims at generating executable bitcode. Rather
than detecting a specific vulnerability, liOS thus provides a
generic iOS analysis framework that detects vulnerabilities
specified by high-level queries. Further, related work includes
iRis, an approach describing the reconstruction of Objective-C
methods calls to detect the use of private APIs [2] and Cricket
[8], a decompiler framework for Objective-C. The difficulty
of analyzing a large corpus of realistic iOS apps has been
addressed by CRiOS [13], a framework for mass downloading
and decrypting apps from the App Store, which achieved a
success rate of ˜51%.
VII. CONCLUSION
With liOS, we push forward the state of the art in static
analysis frameworks for iOS apps. To overcome failing and
incomplete lifting results, we do not rely on one specific
intermediate representation but rather propose an extensible
graph-based representation that is populated from various
reverse engineering frontends. This representation tolerates
missing information and allows static analyses in the form of
graph traversal queries. In addition to the overall approach we
made practical contributions such as the implementation of a
radare2-based disassembly frontend for iOS binaries that fixes
various shortcomings of existing lifters. By means of a simple
data flow based vulnerability, we illustrated how liOS detects
even complex vulnerability patterns using graph traversals.
Part of our future work will be to increase soundness of
our analysis by investigating the modeling of context-sensitive
flows and moving away from generic graph databases to a
performance-optimized graph model.
REFERENCES
[1] Bao, T., Burket, J., Woo, M., Turner, R., Brumley, D.: Byteweight:
Learning to recognize functions in binary code. In: Proceedings of
the 23rd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium. pp. 845–860.
SEC’14, USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA (2014), http://dl.
acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2671225.2671279
Fig. 4: Supergraph of a vulnerable data flow, Instructions (pink), basic blocks (blue), functions (green), methods (red), classes
(gray), and protocols (yellow)
[2] Deng, Z., Saltaformaggio, B., Zhang, X., Xu, D.: iRiS: Vetting Private
API Abuse in iOS Applications. Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) pp. 44–
56 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813675, http://dl.acm.org/
citation.cfm?doid=2810103.2813675
[3] Deshotels, L., Deaconescu, R., Chiroiu, M., Davi, L., Enck, W.,
Sadeghi, A.R.: SandScout. In: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- CCS’16. pp. 704–716. ACM Press, New York, New York,
USA (2016). https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978336, http://dl.acm.
org/citation.cfm?doid=2976749.2978336
[4] DWARF Debugging Information Format Committee: DWARF Debug-
ging Information Format Specification Vesion 5.0 (2017)
[5] Egele, M., Kruegel, C., Kirda, E., Vigna, G., Egele, M., Kruegel, C.,
Kirda, E., Vigna, G.: PiOS: Detecting Privacy Leaks in iOS Applications.
NDSS p. 11 (2011)
[6] Feichtner, J., Missmann, D., Spreitzer, R.: Automated Binary
Analysis on iOS. In: Proceedings of the 11th ACM Confer-
ence on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
- WiSec ’18. pp. 236–247. ACM Press, New York, New York,
USA (2018). https://doi.org/10.1145/3212480.3212487, http://dl.acm.
org/citation.cfm?doid=3212480.3212487
[7] Hexrays: IDA F.L.I.R.T. Technology: In-Depth (2015), https://www.
hex-rays.com/products/ida/tech/flirt/in depth.shtml
[8] Jakub Brˇecˇka: A decompiler for Objective-C. Ph.D. thesis, Univerzita
Karlova (2016), https://is.cuni.cz/webapps/zzp/detail/143329/?lang=en
[9] Janzen, D., De Volder, K.: Navigating and querying code
without getting lost. In: Proceedings of the 2nd international
conference on Aspect-oriented software development -
AOSD ’03. pp. 178–187. ACM Press, New York, New
York, USA (2003). https://doi.org/10.1145/643603.643622,
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=643603.643622
[10] Machiry, A., Spensky, C., Corina, J., Stephens, N., Kruegel, C.,
Vigna, G.: DR. CHECKER: A soundy analysis for Linux kernel
drivers. USENIX Security Symposium pp. 1007–1024 (2017),
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity17/technical-sessions/
presentation/machiry
[11] Martin, M., Livshits, B., Lam, M.S., Martin, M., Livshits, B.,
Lam, M.S.: Finding application errors and security flaws us-
ing PQL. ACM SIGPLAN Notices 40(10), 365 (oct 2005).
https://doi.org/10.1145/1103845.1094840, http://portal.acm.org/citation.
cfm?doid=1103845.1094840
[12] Meng, X., Miller, B.P.: Binary code is not easy. In: Proceedings of the
25th International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis. pp.
24–35. ACM (2016)
[13] Orikogbo, D., Bu¨chler, M., Egele, M.: Crios: Toward large-
scale ios application analysis. In: Proceedings of the 6th Work-
shop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile De-
vices. pp. 33–42. SPSM ’16, ACM, New York, NY, USA (2016).
https://doi.org/10.1145/2994459.2994473
[14] Parr, T.J., Quong, R.W.: Antlr: A predicated-ll (k) parser gen-
erator. Software: Practice and Experience 25(7), 789–810 (1995).
https://doi.org/10.1002/spe.4380250705
[15] Rawat, S., Mounier, L., Potet, M.: LiSTT: an investigation into unsound-
incomplete yet practical result yielding static taintflow analysis. In:
Software Assurance Workhop (SAW 2014) (2014)
[16] Wang, S., Wang, P., Wu, D.: Semantics-aware machine learning for
function recognition in binary code. In: Proceedings - 2017 IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Software Maintenance and Evolution, ICSME
2017 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSME.2017.59
[17] Wang, T., Lu, K., Lu, L., Chung, S.P., Lee, W.: Jekyll on ios: When
benign apps become evil. In: USENIX Security Symposium. vol. 78
(2013)
[18] Webber, J.: A programmatic introduction to neo4j. In: Proceedings of
the 3rd Annual Conference on Systems, Programming, and Applications:
Software for Humanity. pp. 217–218. SPLASH ’12, ACM, New York,
NY, USA (2012). https://doi.org/10.1145/2384716.2384777, http://doi.
acm.org/10.1145/2384716.2384777
[19] Yamaguchi, F., Golde, N., Arp, D., Rieck, K.: In: 2014 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2014.44
